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BEGGING: FREE SPEECH OR POOR
CONDUCT?
The first regulation prohibiting begging can be traced to the
English Statute of Labourers of 1349.1 The early English common
law took a particularly harsh stance against those who chose to
live an "idle" life:
A valiant beggar or a sturdy vagabond shall at the first time
be whipped and sent to the place he was born . . . ; and if he
continue his roguish life, he shall have the upper part of the
gristle of his right ear cut off; and if after that he be taken
wandering in idleness . . . he shall be adjudged and executed
as a felon.'
Though such a draconian approach to the regulation of con-
duct would have no place in our enlightened society, begging re-
mains a criminal activity in a majority of states.3 This Note evalu-
ates whether the first amendment supplies a basis to attack the
constitutionality of statutes that prohibit begging. It considers
whether begging can be classified as traditional speech, symbolic
speech or commercial speech. Additionally, this Note discusses
concerns in drafting a constitutionally sound statute should beg-
ging be worthy of some protection under the first amendment,
and contemplates the possible ramifications of extending first
amendment protection to such activity.
I. BEGGING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment protects political speech and speech which
relates to individual autonomy in matters of opinion, belief, and
expression.' The protection of the first amendment has been ex-
1 Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. III, ch.7. See Ledwith v. Roberts, 1 K.B. 232, 272
(1937) (English regulation of begging and vagrancy can be traced to Statute of Labourers).
' 27 Hen. 8 (1535).
s See infra note 77 (states retaining laws restricting begging and vagrancy).
' See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part that "Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " Id. See Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("viewpoint discrimination is censorship .... "); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
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tended to a wide variety of conduct intended to communicate a
"particularized message." Such protected conduct has included
783 (1978) (first amendment not only fosters self expression, it affords "public access to
discussion, debate, and dissemination of information and ideas"); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 357 (1976) (first amendment protects "freedom to associate with others for common
advancement of political beliefs and ideas"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
339 (1974) ("Under the first amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."); Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (first amendment protects right to receive
information as well as right to dispense it); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (Constitution protects opinion that is not disrup-
tive); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963) (first admendment protects vigorous
advocacy and right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas"(quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), rev'd, 350 U.S. 240 (1959));
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (academic
freedom is central to "the pursuit of truth which the First Amendment is designed to pro-
tect"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Consti-
tution supports theory "that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ...."). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 978-79 (1 1th
ed. 1985) (three major rationales for protecting speech: 1) free speech is an essential of
representative government; 2) free speech is indispensable to discovery and spread of polit-
ical truth and; 3) free speech is required for individual liberty, autonomy, and self-develop-
ment); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 79 (1960) (first amendment addresses "speech
which bears, directly or indirectly, upon issues with which voters have to deal"); Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) ("Constitu-
tional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political."); Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 880 (1963) (freedom of
expression derives from Western notions of individual's right to express beliefs and opin-
ions); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423
(1980) ("Over the years, we have come to view freedom of expression as essential to: (1)
individual self-fulfiliment; (2) the advance of knowledge and discovery of truth; (3) partici-
pation in decision making by all members of society; and (4) maintenance of the proper
balance between stability and change."); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process And The First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1979) (most first amendment
interpretations stress protection either of political speech or of individual rights in matters
of opinion, belief, and expression).
' See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989)
("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected ....."); Texas v. John-
son, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989) (burning the American flag during demonstration is
protected political expression under first amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
26 (1971) (first amendment protects "not only ideas capable of precise, detached explica-
tion, but otherwise inexpressible emotion as well"); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 152 (1969) (it is clear that picketing and parading may constitute methods of expres-
sion, entitled to first amendment protection); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 505-14 (1969) (wearing of black armbands in school environment conveyed unmistak-
able message about public concern with Vietnam War); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
141-42 (1966) (silent sit-in by blacks protesting segregation was protected under the first
amendment); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)
(flags are a form of symbolism and are a "primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas .... "); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (striking down of stat-
ute prohibiting display of red flag as symbol of opposition to organized government);
United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
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the solicitation of money by organized charities.' Therefore, in
determining whether begging is protected speech, the initial ques-
tion to be explored is whether there is a justifiable distinction be-
tween solicitation by charitable organizations and solicitation by
beggars.
A. Traditional Speech
The United States Supreme Court first used the term "charita-
ble solicitation" in a first amendment context in Village of
Shaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.' The Court in
Shaumburg struck down an ordinance barring door-to-door and on
the street solicitations of contributions by charitable organizations
that did not use at least 75% of their receipts for charitable pur-
poses.8 The ordinance defined charitable purposes so as to ex-
clude solicitation expenses." The majority held that limitations on
the amount of funds used on solicitation expenses violated the
first amendment rights of advocacy groups which "gather and dis-
seminate information about and advocate positions on matters of
public concern."10 The Schaumburg majority indicated that "tradi-
("Petitioner's display of [sculptures using American flags to protest Vietnam War] was ...
symbolic speech 'of a nature closely akin to pure speech,' hence embued [sic] with the
protections of the First Amendment."). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrurriONAL LAW,
§ 12-7, at 829-32 (2d. ed. 1988) (Supreme Court has found various types of expression to
be protected under first amendment, including pure speech as well as expressive conduct);
Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63,
79-80 (1968) (conduct that is intended as expression and can be comprehended as such,
may be protected speech).
I See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 787-89 (1988) (case law suggests
that charitable solicitations are a form of protected speech); Secretary of the State of Mary-
land v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 967-68 (1984) (restrictions involving charita-
ble solicitations may be unconstitutionally overbroad if they limit first amendment activity);
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980)
(charitable solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and persuasive
speech afforded free speech status). See also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (first amendment protection is not lost
where contributions are solicited); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (state may
not prohibit distribution of handbills in pursuit of religious activity merely because they
promote, raising of funds); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (state cannot
prevent collection of donations for religious purposes although it may still regulate it).
7 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
Shaumburg, 444 U.S. at 622, 639.
* Id. at 624.
10 Id. at 635-36. The Court concurred with the court of appeals in identifying a class of
organizations whose primary purpose is to advocate positions on matters of public concern,
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tional charitable organizations" that provided support to the
needy and poor might indeed be made to comply with the 75%
limitation, but such a broad limitation could not be constitution-
ally applied to groups whose fundamental purpose is advocacy-ori-
ented.11 The Court reasoned that non-traditional charitable orga-
nizations that act primarily as public advocates would be unfairly
disadvantaged by such a limiting statute, since a large portion of
their funding goes into promoting and researching information
related to issues of interest to them. 2 Invoking the doctrine of
overbreadth,' the Court struck down the ordinance on the
ground that the 75% limitation inhibited communicative activities
safeguarded by established first amendment interests. 4
The Court revisited the area of charitable solicitations in Secre-
tary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc. " and Riley v.
National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc." and reiter-
ated its desire to protect only organized charities that demonstrate
and which use paid solicitors who combine the solicitation of financial support with advo-
cacy. Id. "Organizations of this kind .... would necessarily spend more than 25 percent of
their budgets on [solicitation] expenses and would be completely barred from solicit[ing]..
* ." Id. at 635. Solicitation in this context is "intertwined with informative speech ...
seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political or social
issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advo-
cacy would likely cease." Id. at 632. Solicitors for charitable solicitations are "more than
solicitors for money" and their activity is protected by the first amendment. Id. at 632. See
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The Court ruled that a ban on unlicensed commu-
nication was unconstitutional because it abridged the free speech rights of "one who wishes
to present his views on political, social or economic questions." Id. at 163.
" Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635. The Schaumburg majority included the court of appeal's
distinction between "solicitors [who] represent themselves as mere conduits for contribu-
tions," and those groups that ask for contributions as public advocates. Id. The court of
appeals indicated that enforcing regulations against the former charities would be permissi-
ble, and implied soliciting money to help the needy or poor is not protected by the first
amendment. Id. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) ("[g]eneral
regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test..
• is not open to any constitutional objection"); National Found. v. Fort Worth, 415 F.2d
41, 45 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970) ("No constitutional right exists to
make a public solicitation of funds for charity.").
12 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 635-36.
" See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (discussion of overbreadth doctrine).
" Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 635-39 (1980) (the
75% limitation is direct and significant limitation on first amendment activity that cannot
be justified by any substantial governmental interest). See also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the
Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 788 (1988) (ordinance in Schaumburg "was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the . . .principle asserted interest: prevention of fraud").
"8 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
1" 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
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a close nexus between solicitation and traditional first amendment
activities.1" Hence, Schaumburg and its.progeny limit first amend-
ment protection to organized charities that essentially function as
public advocates with an intent to communicate and disseminate
ideas to further public awareness."
The Court's holdings in Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley are
properly limited to what can be characterized as a legal definition
of charity. Courts have defined charity as an activity which bene-
fits an indefinite number of persons by the advocacy of religion,
education, or relief from disease, and by assisting people to estab-
lish themselves in life.' 9 For tax purposes, charitable organizations
are associated with the promotion of social, educational, scientific,
and religious causes that are matters of public concern, and in-
volve an intent to communicate information and opinion. 0 Al-
" Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966-67
(1984). The Court struck down a statute regulating contracts between charities and profes-
sional fundraisers as being overbroad since the law would "restrict First Amendment activ-
ity that results in high costs but is itself a part of the charity's goal or that is ... attributa-
ble to the fact that the charity's cause [is] . . . unpopular." Id. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 789
(quoting Munson language). The Court held that the regulations at issue were unconstitu-
tional based on the same grounds enumerated in Schaumburg and Munson. Id. The Court
reasoned that the statute would chill speech and drive out fundraisers, or at least discour-
age them from fundraising for charities, that combined solicitation with the advocacy and
the dissemination of information, thereby restricting the charities' ability to speak. Id.
1" See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1990).
"[N]either Schaumburg nor its progeny stand for the proposition that begging and panhan-
dling are protected speech under the First Amendment." Id. "Rather, these cases hold that
there is a sufficient nexus between solicitation by organized charities and a 'variety of
speech interests' to invoke protection under the First Amendment." Id.
"' See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 213 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Johnson v. South Blue Hill
Cemetery Ass'n, 221 A.2d 280, 287 (Me. 1966)). Charity in the absence of legislation "is
an attempt in good faith, spiritually, physically, intellectually, socially and economically to
advance and benefit mankind in general, or those in need of advancement ... with positive
abnegation, of gain or profit by donor .... " Black's Law Dictionary 213 (5th ed. 1979)
(quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Tax Comm'r, 5 Ohio St. 2d 117, 120, 214 N.E.2d
222, 225 (1966)). See also Comment, Loitering Permitted: A Valid Weapon is Taken From the
Arsenal that Combats Crime in Transportation, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1990) (per-
sons able to work but existing on charity were vagrants at common law).
" See 26 U.S.C.A. §501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1990). This section provides tax exempt status
to "[clorporations . . . operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes .... no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual .... ." See also Regan v.
Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 541 n.1 (1983) (holding In-
ternal Revenue Code §503(c)(3) does not violate first amendment). Congress may choose to
subsidize certain groups more extensively than others. Id. at 550. See Houck, With Charity
for All, 93 YALE L. J. 1415, 1419 (1984) which provides:
[t]he section [501(c)] is broad and within it one finds separate provisions for, among
243
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 5: 239, 1990
though few courts have addressed the issue of whether begging is
within the definition of "charity," those courts which have desig-
nated begging as a form of charity have equated it to the helping
of the needy or poor . 1 The Supreme Court has labelled this form
of charity as "traditional charity" and has recognized that it may
be regulated since it lacks the necessary elements that form free
speech. 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist has openly stated that panhan-
dling is a form of conduct which may be properly regulated by
local government."
others, churches and hospitals, civic leagues and veterans organizations, labor un-
ions, irrigation companies, animal shelters and benevolent life insurance organiza-
tions. In common, these are non-profit organizations: they work for something other
than their own financial gain.
Id. See generally Note, Has the Supreme Court Laid Fertile Ground for Invalidating the Regula-
tory Interpretation of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(cX3)?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 564,
570 (1983) (courts seek certain characteristics when classifying an entity as charity pursuant
to §501(c)(3)).
" See, e.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). The district court quoted
the Random House Dictionary of the English Language defining "beg" as "to ask for as a
gift, as charity or as a favor. ... Id. at 350. In addition, the court defined charity as
"[tlhe provision of help or relief to the poor" or "[s]omething that is given to help the
needy." Id. at 353. See CCB v. Florida, 458 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Beggars
"seek welfare and sustenance for themselves, by their own hand and voice rather than by
means of the muscle and mouths of others." Id. "'[C]harity begins at home,' and ... the
less fortunate of our societal admixture should be permitted... to apply for self help." Id.
See also Note, The Beggars Free Speech, 65 IND. L. J. 191, 201 (1989). "Beg" is defined as
"[tlo ask a favor, and hence to beseech; entreat or supplicate with humility or earnestness;
more specifically, to ask for as a charity, especially habitually or from house to house." Id.
" See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (Court protected what it called "charita-
ble solicitations" because it involved communicating of ideas as opposed to mere solicita-
tion of money for poor and needy). See also Nat'l Foundation v. Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41,
45 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970) ("[tlhe reasonable regulation of chari-
table organizations is within a government's police power"); Ulmer v. Municipal Court for
Oakland-Piedmont J.D., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (begging can be regulated since it "bear[s] no necessary relationship to the freedom
to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion [and] does not abridge the guar-
antees of the First Amendment"). But see Young, 729 F. Supp. at 352. "[A] meaningful
distinction cannot be drawn for First Amendment purposes between solicitations for char-
ity and begging." Id. "While often disturbing and sometimes alarmingly graphic, begging is
unmistakably informative and persuasive speech." Id. "Both solicitors for organized chari-
ties and beggars approach passersby, request a donation, and perhaps explain why they
want the money." Id. "To argue, then, that solicitations for money by beggars have less
communicative content than solicitations by organized charities is to differentiate more on
the basis of the source of the speech than on its content." Id. See Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). "Charitable solicitation of
funds has been recognized by this Court as a form of protected speech." Id.
Is See Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 644
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("nothing in the United States Constitution should pre-
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B. Symbolic Conduct
It is firmly established that the first amendment does not afford
the same protection and freedom to those who communicate ideas
through conduct rather than through the spoken word.2 4 The
Court has been wary of giving generalized free speech shelter to
expressive conduct because of the fear that granting such protec-
tion would open the door to requiring protection of all forms of
conduct.2 5 Although certain conduct is initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by language, it does not necessarily follow that regula-
tion of the conduct is an abridgement of free speech.2 6
vent residents of a community from making the collective judgment that certain worthy
charities may solicit ... while at the same time insulating themselves against panhandlers,
profiteers, and peddlers."). See also Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Free-
dom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) ("profit motivated .. .speech lacks the crucial connec-
tions with individual liberty and self-realization . . .which are central to justifications for
the constitutional protection of speech ....").
" See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("First and Fourteenth Amendments
have never been thought to give absolute protection to every individual ...to use any
form of address in any circumstances that he chooses."); Cox v. Louisiana [Cox I] 379 U.S.
536, 555 (1965) (first amendment does not afford same protection to those who communi-
cate ideas by conduct); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 848 (2d
Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting) ("Even though intended as expression, symbolic speech
remains conduct, subject to regulation by the state."). See also Nimmer, The Meaning of
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 31 (1973) ("The distinction
often made is between 'pure speech' which is entitled to the full panoply of first amend-
ment protection, and symbolic speech or speech plus, which is to receive some ill-defined
lesser degree of protection.") (footnotes omitted). See generally W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRE-
TATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21-49 (1984) (comprehensive analysis of various meth-
ods of judicial review and classification of speech).
"5 See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view
that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."); Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131, 165 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[I]t should be remembered that if one group
can take over libraries for one cause, other groups will assert the right to do so for causes
which, while wholly legal, may not be so appealing to this Court."). See also W. BERNS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 186 (1976). Berns suggests
that "expression" deserves less protection than "speech" because only "speech" is "con-
nected to rationality, and it is man's rationality that makes him, unlike other animals, a
being capable of governing himself." Id. But see Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1091, 1107 (1968) ("[D]enial of first amendment protection for communicative conduct
unnecessarily alienates those who do not possess verbal skills.")
" Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). See Cox v. Louisiana
[Cox II], 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965) (upheld Louisiana statute which prohibited picketing
near courthouse). The Cox Court held "that this statute on its face is a valid law dealing
with conduct subject to regulation so as to vindicate important interests of society and that
the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitu-
tional protection." Id.
245
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In Spence v. Washington,'7 the Supreme Court formulated a two-
part test for determining whether certain conduct is sufficiently
"imbued with elements of communication" to fall within the
scope of the first and fourteenth amendments. 2 The actor's con-
duct must satisfy both parts of the test to qualify as protected
speech.2 9 The first part of the test focuses on the actor's intent to
communicate "a particularized message."30 The second part re-
quires that the intended communication is likely to be understood
by the observer as being "within the contours of the first amend-
ment." 1 In focusing on the actor's intent to communicate and the
observer's interest in understanding the expression, the test is
closely fitted to the traditional goals of advancing knowledge and
disseminating information about matters of general public import,
which are forms of communication the first amendment was
designed to protect.32
When the Spence test is applied to the act of begging, it becomes
apparent that begging is generally deficient with respect to both
parts of the test. 3 A beggar's primary intent is to solicit money
* 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). In Spence, the defendant had been convicted under
Washington's "improper use" statute prohibiting the exhibition of a defaced United States
flag. Id. at 406-07. The defendant, protesting the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State
killings, displayed the American flag outside his apartment window with a large peace sym-
bol attached. Id. at 408. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute infringed
upon a form of protected expression. Id. at 414-15.
s Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974). See Note, First Amendment Protec-
tion of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 467, 476 n.56 (1984). "Courts have widely
acknowledged that Spence provides a test for considering whether conduct is eligible for
protection." Id. "As the Supreme Court was ultimately to recognize in Spence, the test for
determining when first amendment protection is appropriate should not focus on whether
the act is more like speech than conduct, since conduct itself is often expressive. Rather,
the test should focus on whether the conduct is communicative." Id. at 476. See also T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 81 (1970) (the conduct must "be in-
tended as communication and capable of being understood by others as such."); Henkin,
supra note 5, at 79-80 ("The meaningful constitutional distinction is not between speech
and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of con-
duct.").
" Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. The Spence Court found "[a]n intent to convey a particu-
larized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id.
80 Id. at 411.
831 Id. at 415 ("Moreover, [the actor's] message was direct, likely to be understood, and
within the contours of the First Amendment.").
" See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. See generally Note, supra note 28, at 476-78 (discussing
two-part test enunciated in Spence).
" See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 152-54 (2d Cir. 1990).
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for the purpose of bettering his economic condition, and any
"message" created by this conduct is purely incidental to the mo-
tive of the beggar. 4 Since begging is not inextricably intertwined
with an intent to communicate a particularized message concern-
ing traditional first amendment values, it falls outside the reach of
Spence."6 Furthermore, passersby would have to perceive a beg-
gar's conduct as communicating a particular message that is
within the bounds of traditional first amendment speech.36 Al-
though begging may suggest various messages, such as deteriorat-
ing economic conditions, lack of government services for the poor
or the disdainful choice of individuals to live idle, unproductive
lives, it does not rise to the universal level of expressive communi-
cation as symbolized by the wearing of black arm bands" or the
burning of an American flag. 8
C. Protected Commercial Speech
If begging is not a form of protected speech or symbolic con-
duct, may it qualify as a form of constitutionally protected com-
mercial speech? The Supreme Court has stated that "speech is
protected even though it is carried in a form that is sold for
"Pursuant to the criteria articulated in Spence .... begging is not inseparably intertwined
with a 'particularized message.' " Id. at 153. "Given the [subway] passengers' apprehensive
state of mind, it seems rather unlikely that they would be disposed to focus attention on
any message, let alone a tacit and particularized one." Id. at 154.
See Young, 903 F.2d at 154 ("The only message ... common to all acts of begging is
that beggars want to exact money from those whom they accost."); Ulmer v. Municipal
Court for Oakland Piedmont J.D., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) ("Begging and soliciting for alms do not necessarily involve the communica-
tion of information or opinion; therefore approaching individuals for that purpose is not
protected by the First Amendment."). See also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("a simple request for
money lies far from the core protections of the First Amendment .... ); Baker, supra note
23, at 3 (commercial speech does not merit first amendment protection).
See supra notes 32 and 33 (citing supporting proposition that begging is not constitu-
tionally protected).
See supra notes 32 and 33 (citing supporting proposition that begging is not constitu-
tionally protected).
" See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (wearing armbands
for purpose of conveying political ideas is "closely akin to 'pure speech' " and therefore is
protected by first amendment).
See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2534 (1989). The Court asserted that "we have
had little difficulty identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags .... Id.
at 2539. "Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this Nation as does
the combiration of letters found in 'America.' " Id. at 2540.
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profit, and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase
or otherwise pay or contribute money."' 9 This type of speech may
be referred to as "commercial speech," and is defined as speech
that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction.
4 0
The doctrine of commercial speech rests on a clear distinction be-
tween the market of ideas and the market for goods and ser-
vices.4 1 The government cannot suppress the solicitation of com-
mercial transactions that impair the economic welfare of the
individual consumer and which contribute to overall economic
inefficiency.' 2
The Constitution, however, affords lesser protection to com-
mercial speech than other constitutionally privileged expression.4
3
There can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial solicitations that do not accurately inform the public
$9 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 761 (1976). The issue before the Court was "whether speech which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction, is so removed from any exposition of ideas, ...
that it lacks all protection." Id. at 762 (citations omitted). The Court held that it is not. Id.
See Goldstein v. Town of Nantucket, 477 F. Supp. 606, 609 (D. Mass. 1979) (troubadour
who accepted contributions during his performance did not dilute his first amendment
rights).
"o Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citing Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
"1 See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 4, at 2, 40 (freedom of speech protects economic
liberty and efficiency). See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (commercial speech is
indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions).
"' See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 ("consumer's interest in the free flow of com-
mercial information ... may be ... keener ... than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate"); Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 561-62 (1980) ("[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible
dissemination of information"); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 4, at 25-28 (first amendment
protects "aggregate economic efficiency").
48 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63. The Court acknowledged that it had recog-
nized the common sense difference between commercial speech and other varieties of
speech. Id. at 562. "The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression." Id. at 562-63. See Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("Rather than subject the First Amend-
ment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited mea-
sure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amend-
ment values .... ); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("Advertising, like all
public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public
interest."); See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-7
(3d ed. 1986) (political speech is granted the broadest protection, while commercial speech
is subjected to greater constitutionally valid regulations).
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about lawful activity." It is within the government's power to
"ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
than inform it."'"
In enacting anti-solicitation or begging statutes, states have
taken an interest in protecting their citizens " 'from fraud, crime,
and undue annoyance.' "46 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that such interests are substantial,'7 and where a state has a sub-
stantial interest it may limit commercial expression proportionate
to the interest as long as the restriction is direct and not overly
extensive in achieving its goal."8 The Court has gone so far as to
uphold a ban on commercial speech that merely had the potential
to mislead the public. 9 Even if begging can be classified as a form
of commercial transaction involving the use of commercial speech,
state and local governments may shield their citizens from annoy-
ing and fraudulent panhandlers and beggars as long as such regu-
lations are not overly restrictive in accomplishing their objective.6
IL BEGGING ASSUMED TO BE SPEECH
While it is the authors' opinion that begging does not fall within
any recognized category of protected speech, for the sake of this
" See infra note 49 (permissible to protect public from misleading commercial speech).
" Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13-16
(1979) (Court rejected first amendment attack on Texas law prohibiting practice of optom-
etry under trade name on grounds that state's interest in protecting public from misleading
and deceptive use of such names is substantial); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) ("utterances [that] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
", See Secretary of the State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 980
(1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 636
(1980); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 793 (1988); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Pied-
mont J.D., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 265, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1976).
" Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
" Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
The Court established a four part test for determining whether certain regulations of com-
mercial speech abridge the first amendment, and as part of the test the government "must
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrict[ing] [the] commercial speech." Id.
The regulation also must be in proportion to the state's interest to be valid. Id.
" Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467 ("[ilt. .. is not unreasonable, or violative of the Constitution,
for a State to respond with what in effect is a prophylactic rule"); Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (a state has a substantial interest in protecting the public from deceptive
and misleading commercial speech).
" See infra notes 64-66 (discussing narrowly tailored requirement).
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analysis, the assumption is made that begging implicates first
amendment rights. However, even if begging were to be classi-
fied as a form of speech, this would not necessarily preclude the
ability of government to regulate such conduct.
The Supreme Court has applied two very similar tests in cases
where there has been a restriction of conduct alleged to be
speech.51 In United States v. O'Brien, 2 the Court fashioned a test to
see when symbolic conduct may be regulated. If the regulation is
1) within the constitutional power of government; 2) furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; 3) which is unre-
0' Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298, 298 n.8 (1984)
(four-factor test of O'Brien is similar to standards applied to time, place and manner restric-
tions, thus if statute passes time, place, or manner test it would be "untenable to invalidate
it under O'Brien on ground that government interest is insufficient," or due to "inadequate
nexus between regulation and the interest sought to be served"). See Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989) ("the O'Brien test 'in the last analysis is little, if any,
different from the standard applied to time, place or manner restriction.'" (quoting Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 298 (footnote omitted))); Texas v. Johnson, 109
S. Ct. 2533, 2540-41 (1989) (same); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789, 803-10 (1984) (applying O'Brien test Court turned to time, place, or manner
analysis on question whether restriction was substantially broader than necessary); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (weighing and
balancing of time, place, and manner test and municipal regulations indirectly affecting
free speech are essentially the same). See also Comment, Restricting Election Day Exit Polling:
Freedom of Expression vs. the Right to Vote, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1003, 1009 (1990) (time, place,
manner and O'Brien are similar because they both deal with regulations that do not set out
to restrict speech, yet do so incidentially); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 46, 50-51 (1987) (Supreme Court has made it clear that "time, place, or manner" and
O'Brien test are substantively identical standards); Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum
Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 3 7 HASTINGS
L.J. 439, 448-49 n.51 (1986).
Both the O'Brien test and the time, place, and manner test require the government
to demonstrate that its regulation serves an important governmental interest. Simi-
larly, O'Brien requires that the regulation be content-neutral, rather than being trig-
gered by the subject matter of the speaker's message or his point of view .... As a
whole, however, the time, place, and manner test is more speech-protective than the
O'Brien test because it also requires that the speaker have alternative access for dis-
seminating his speech.
Id.
', 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 369-70. O'Brien was prosecuted for burning his draft card which he claimed was
an act of symbolic expression protected by first amendment. Id. See Texas v. Johnson, 109
S. Ct. 2533, 2538 (1989) (first, Court must decide whether conduct is expressive, and if so,
Court will determine whether it satisfies O'Brien test); Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. at 294 (symbolic expression may be limited if it passes O'Brien test). See also
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1,*46 n.227 (1984)
(O'Brien Court created four part test to determine whether government regulation of sym-
bolic speech was justified).
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lated to the suppression of free expression; and 4) the incidental
restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater
than necessary, then the Court will apply a relatively lenient level
of scrutiny to the regulation.64 Closely related to the O'Brien test is
the test of reasonable time, place, or manner regulations.5 5 Re-
strictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,5 6 are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,5 7
and leave open ample alternative channels for communication. 58
The third part of the O'Brien test, which requires that the gov-
ernment's interest be unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion, is closely akin to the content-neutral requirement of time,
place or manner restrictions.59 Both require that the govern-
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. A "sufficiently important governmental interest in regulat-
ing the nonspeech element" will justify incidental limitations on first amendment activities
when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same course of conduct. Id. at
376. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (1989) (O'Brien's relatively lenient standard is limited to
those cases where government's interest is not related to suppression of expression); Wel-
born, Recent Development: Texas v. Johnson: The United States Supreme Court Reaffirms the Very
Principles of Freedom for which the American Flag S'tands, 64 TuLsA L. REV. 265, 267-68 n.24
(1989) (if regulation is not related to the suppression of expression, lenient standard of
O'Brien applies); BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Cam-
paign Finance Reform, 73 CALuF. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (1985) (one of O'Brien's conditions for
lenient scrutiny is that government interest not be related to the suppression of speech).
See supra note 51 (similarity of O'Brien test and time, place or manner test).
See infra notes 59 and 60 (content neutral requirement).
See infra notes 67-70 (narrowly tailored requirement).
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989) ("reasonable time,
place, or manner restrictions may be imposed even in a public forum so long as they 'are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alter-
native channels for communication of the information.' ") (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488
(1988) (initial question determining level of scrutiny to apply is whether statute is based on
content of speech, then whether statute is narrowly tailored to serve significant govern-
ment interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) ("[Sjtate may . . .enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alterna-
tive channels of communication) (citations ommitted). See also Note, Time, Place, or Manner
Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 127, 141, 141 n.87 (1983) (time,
place, manner restrictions on commercial speech must be "content-neutral, serve a signifi-
cant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication";
Virginia Pharmacy left out requirement that restriction be narrowly tailored).
n See Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2754 ("principle inquiry in determining content
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place or manner cases in particular, is
whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with
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ment's interest in regulating the particular conduct not be moti-
vated by a desire to prohibit the message contained therein.6" The
regulation must be aimed at the non-speech element in order to
justify its limiting effect on first amendment activities. 6'
As previously discussed, the motive of government in regulating
begging is to further the substantial interests of protecting peace
and order, promoting the unimpeded flow of traffic and protect-
ing the citizenry from what can often be aggressive and offensive
behavior.62 The promotion of such interests is within the scope of
the message it conveys" (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 295)). See
also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84 (flat ban on all residential picketing was found content-
neutral); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (statute preventing picketing that was
critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of embassy was found content-based); Note,
The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1904, 1904
(1989) (In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), "the Court articu-
lated a new 'secondary-effects' test for distinguishing content specific from content neutral
regulations. This test treats a regulation that on its face is content-specific as content-neu-
tral provided that the ordinance is justified by a desire to eliminate a 'secondary harm' - a
harm unrelated to the communicative impact of speech"); Note, Motivation Analysis in Light
of Renton, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 344, 354, 354 & n.70 (1987) ("[Cllassic content-neutral regula-
tion is motivated neither by fear of communicative impact nor by disagreement with
speech, but by a desire to regulate the environmental effects of speech.").
See supra notes 58 and 59 (content neutrality). See also City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (content-neutral regulations "are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech" (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976))). A regulation
aimed at the content of speech presumptively violates the first amendment. Renton, 475
U.S. at 46-47. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 & n.7 (1980) (statute prohibiting
all non-labor picketing meant content of speech would determine whether statute was vio-
lated); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (permissible picketing
defined by message on picket sign meant regulation was content-based). Accord Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985) (Court stated in
dictum existence of reasonable basis for limiting access to nonpublic forum will not justify
regulation that is really facade for viewpoint discrimination); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 581 (1965) (government cannot pick and choose among view it is willing to allow). But
cf. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976). A content based restriction was upheld by
the Court because while a military base allows access to the public, it is not a public forum,
its primary goal is to train soldiers. Id. Therefore, the commanding officer can restrict
distribution of a publication due to the government's compelling interest in protecting loy-
alty, discipline and morale of the troops under his command. Id. But the commanding
officer cannot prevent distribution of a publication merely because he disagrees with its
message. Id.
61 See supra notes 58-60 (content neutrality).
See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 158 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[B]egging in the subway often amounts to nothing less than assault, creating in the pas-
sengers the apprehension of imminent danger."). Cf. Members of City Council v. Taxpay-
ers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805-06 (1984) (municipalities have "weighty" interest in
restricting unpleasant and intrusive formats for expression (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949) (city has power to protect citizens from methods of expression prop-
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governmental authority." By regulating begging the government
seeks to prohibit intrusive conduct which would be deleterious re-
gardless of its communicative value.6
If all acts of begging can be interpreted as involving a form of
protected communication, then it appears that a complete ban on
begging would outlaw an entire category of speech. At first
glance, a blanket prohibition does not appear to satisfy a narrowly
tailored requirement." However, the narrow tailoring require-
ment has been applied with differing force depending on the in-
terests involved, and even complete bans on some activity have
been held to pass the narrowly tailored criteria."'
One standard of review that has been applied asks whether a
erly deemed nuisance))); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974)
(city justified in protecting unwilling viewers from intrusive advertising on public transpor-
tation that is rapid, convenient, pleasant and inexpensive).
" See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 367, 373 (1986) (state has authority under its police
power to protect community from dangerous tendencies of those mentally ill (citing Add-
ington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S, 490, 552 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (aesthetic considerations would be sufficient to
justify content-neutral ban on all outdoor advertising notwithstanding first amendment),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 n.13
(1975) ("a narrowly drawn non-discriminatory traffic regulation requiring screening of
drive-in movie theaters from the view of motorists" may be reasonble exercise of police
power); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 95 (1965) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (police power of municipality is ample to deal with traffic conditions - if person ob-
structed sidewalk he could be asked to move on and if he refused, arrested); McGowen v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961) (police enactments dealing with protection of public
health, morals, safety, peace and order are within police power (citing Hiller v. Maryland,
124 Md. 385, 393 (1914)).
, See Young, 903 F.2d at 159.
Quite apart from any particularized idea or message it might arguably possess, beg-
ging poses significant dangers to the subway system. The conduct threatens passen-
ger well-being and safety as well as disrupts the system's smooth operation. These
dangers, independent of the alleged communicative character of begging, give rise
to the regulation. Even if begging had no communicative character at all, these inde-
pendent dangers would be just as real, and consequently there would remain a sub-
stantial governmental interest in prohibiting the conduct in the subway.
Id.
" See supra notes 52-58 (O'Brien test requires restriction on first amendment activities be
no greater than necessary, while time, place or manner regulations require narrow tailor-
ing to serve significant government interest).
" See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 810 (complete ban on posting of signs on public
property is valid time, place, or manner regulation). See also Young, 903 F.2d at 156 ("[T]he
problems posed by begging and panhandling could be addressed by nothing less than the
enforcement of a total ban."); Note, Motivation Analysis in Light of Renton, 87 COLuM. L.
REv. 344, 345 n.5 (1987) ("Content-neutral restrictions need not take the form of time,
manner, place restrictions: a regulation banning all speech is content-neutral. Nonetheless
most content-neutral restrictions are time, manner, place restrictions .... ").
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substantial government interest would be achieved less effectively
absent the regulation"'; if so, then the regulation would stand pro-
vided the rest of the time, place or manner requirements were
satisfied."8 It is submitted that under this standard of review a
blanket prohibition on begging would satisfy the narrowly tailored
requirement. It is suggested that by restricting the government's
ability to enact laws that prohibit begging to limited circumstances
or areas would merely result in a repositioning of the activity
from one area, or from one manner, to another. Such limitations
would result in the constant need to redefine the parameters of
the legislation as those predisposed to engage in the activity
sought to be suppressed fashion new methods to ply their trade.
In essence, less than a blanket prohibition would result in pushing
the problem down the block.
The narrow tailoring requirement has also been applied with a
heavier hand."' At times, the Court has demanded that the regu-
lation target and eliminate no more than "the exact source of the
67 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757-58, n.6 (1989).
[A] regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate content-neutral interests but that it
need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation" (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2757-58 n.6. See Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash Between the
First and Twenty-First Amendments, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 184 n.200 (1984). "Less restric-
tive alternatives analysis does not require that the government adopt only those alterna-
tives that entail no loss of effectiveness .... Rather it requires that the potential gain in
free speech from using less restrictive regulatory methods be weighed against the loss in
effectiveness . . . ot these alternatives." Id (citing Comment, First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 243-51
(1976)). See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484-90, 1484-85 n.16
(1975) (discussing various forms of balancing test that Court uses in context of free
speech).
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text (time, place or manner requirements).
e See Note, The Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial Response
to Municipal Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 561, 562
(1988) [hereinafter The Search] (judicial analysis in first amendment field " 'has totally failed
to settle on any coherent approach or to bring together its various doctrines into a consis-
tent whole' "(quoting EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM or EXPRESSION 16 (1970)). "Since
the Justices have difficulty agreeing upon the significance of [various] factors and the
proper method to be used in applying them to a given situation, the Court's first amend-
ment position appears to shift as each Justice writes an opinion." The Search, supra, at 563.
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evil sought to be remedied.17 0 It is submitted that under this
stricter standard, a blanket prohibition on begging would burden
a substantial amount of speech which does not threaten to violate
the governmental interests justifying such a regulation. Further-
more, it is submitted that a beggar who sits passively by the way-
side would not impede traffic or threaten passersby, thus falling
outside of the "evil" sought to be remedied; pedestrians and com-
muters would not be hindered or subjected to aggressive behavior
from such conduct. Accordingly, a statute that punishes those who
accost for the purpose of begging is illustrative of how a law could
be drafted to survive even the more stringent "narrowly tailored"
requirement."
Time, place, or manner restrictions also require that ample al-
ternative channels of communication be left open.7 2 Theoreti-
cally, the poor and homeless would not be deprived of the many
forums where speech on issues of social importance are permit-
ted. 3 In reality, it is doubtful that those who engage in the daily
activity of pleading for enough money to feed themselves would
avail themselves to such alternatives; this is because a beggar's pri-
mary intent is usually not the exposition of ideas as contemplated
by the first amendment.74 Begging is conduct that is not devoid of
70 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets
and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy.") (citing
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-10). "A complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but
only if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil."
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. See Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. at 2761 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"[Tlhe Court has interpreted the narrow tailoring requirement to mandate an examination
of alternative methods of serving the asserted governmental interest and a determination
whether the greater efficacy of the challenged regulation outweights the increased burden
it places on protected speech." Id. (citations omitted). See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). "In places which by long tradition or by govern-
ment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit expres-
sive activity are sharply circumscribed." Id. "For the State to enforce a content-based ex-
clusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
461 (1980)). See Quadres, Neutral Public Forum Regulations, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 471
(1986) (Court has applied narrowly tailored requirement with high degree of scrutiny when
it was suspected that regulation was really content based).
71 See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (example of narrowly tailored statute).
71 See supra note 56 (citing supporting authority).
"" See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 (government's ability to limit expressive activ-
ity depends in part on classification of forum as either "traditional", "designated" or "non-
traditonal").
" See supra note 34 (decisions that solicitation does not necessarily involve speech).
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emotion, but such has never been the standard on which to judge
whether the first amendment protects it.7 There are obvious dan-
gers in heading down this path. 6 Would a drunkard's conduct be
protected by the first amendment because his drinking in public
causes us to think of hardship or the lack of help provided by the
State? Is a prostitute's solicitation protected as a commentary on
the morals of certain individuals?
III. EXISTING PENAL PROVISIONS - OTHER STATUTORY CONCERNS
Presently, a majority of states have statutes that restrict the act
of begging. 7" Approximately half of these statutes do not pro-
scribe begging, but instead authorize counties, city councils and
municipalities to regulate and punish begging. 78 The remaining
statutes proscribe begging or a form of activity analogous to
begging. 9
75 See supra notes 28-32 (Spence test) and notes 52-58 (conduct as speech tested under
O'Brien or time, place or manner).
71 See supra note 25 (first amendment does not protect limitless variety of conduct).
7 See ALA. CODE § 13A- I1-9(a)(1) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2905(a)(3) (1989);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-71-213, 14-54-1408 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-112(2)(a) (1989);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1321(4) (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1101(1)(e) (1988); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-54 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4108(e) (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:107 (West 1986); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, §§ 63, 64 (Law. Co-op. 1980); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.725 (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-37 (1972); Morr. CODE
ANN. § 7-32-4304 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-102, cl. 23 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§47:17, cl. XIII (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §40:48-1(7) (West Supp. 1967); N.C. GENu. STAT.
§160A-179 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01, cl. 43 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
715.55 (Anderson 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-51 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§
3901, 3902 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 8-21-10 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 947.02(4) (West Supp.
1982); WYo. STAT. § 15-1-103, cl. (a)(xvii) (1990). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-146.6
(West Supp. 1990) (prohibiting begging in air, bus or marine terminals); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.35(1) (McKinney 1990) (held unconstitutional in Young v. New York City Transit
Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, in part, vacated in part, 903 F.2d 146 (2d
Cir. 1990)).
7'8 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-54-1408 (1987) (city council); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 11-
5-4 (1962) (corporate authorities of each municipality); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-8-2-11 (West
1982) (local governments); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32-4304 (1989) (municipal council); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 14-102, cl. 23 (1987) (metropolitan cities); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:17, cl.
XIII (1971) (city councils); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-1(7) (West 1987) (municipalities); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-179 (1987) (county); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-05-01, cl. 43 (1989) (munici-
pal corporations); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.55(b) (Anderson 1976) (municipal corpora-
tions); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 9-29-10 (Supp. 1989) (municipalities); UTAH CODE ANN. §
10-8-51 (1986) (cities and towns); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.22.280(34) (1990) (first class
cities); W. VA. CODE § 8-21-10 (1990) (municipal corporations); Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-103, cl.
(a)(xvii) (1990) (cities and towns).
" See supra note 77 (listing statutes).
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Assuming that some begging may fall within the scope of the
first amendment, when the fundamental right of free speech col-
lides with an activity that is deemed criminal, there is a risk that
otherwise protected speech will be deterred. 80 Additionally, there
is a risk that prosecution may result from mere disagreement with
the message.8 Because first amendment activities must be given
ample protection from regulation,82 a statute, susceptible to appli-
cation in the sphere of protected activity, must be drawn with
"narrow specificity" 83 in order to avoid encroaching upon such
activity. This drafting restriction means that a statute should not
be phrased in terms that include protected speech or that lacks
guidelines which make clear what speech may be punished. 4
A. Overbreadth
A constitutional attack based on overbreadth is a claim that a
statute, although designed to punish activity which is not constitu-
tionally protected, is invalid because it includes activity that is oth-
erwise guarded by the first amendment. 8 A claim of overbreadth
80 See Collins v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (laws that can be applied
to protected speech exercise unacceptable inhibiting effect upon free debate), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1979). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 844, 871-73 (1970) [hereinafter Note, Overbreadthl.
0' See infra note 97 (vague statutes within realm of first amendment may promote dis-
criminatory enforcement based on message).
i See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2695
(1989) (national commitment to free exchange of ideas demands area of "breathing space"
so that protected speech is not discouraged (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963))); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (commitment to principle that "debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open" (quoting New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466 (1987)
(same); Button, 371 U.S. at 433 ("first amendment freedoms need breathing space to sur-
vive, government may regulate ... only with narrow specificity" (quoting Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940))).
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (first
amendment requires controls on door to door soliciting to be drawn with narrow specific-
ity). Accord Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (uncertain meanings require indi-
viduals to 'steer far wider of unlawful zone' than when boundaries are clearly marked (cit-
ing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 526 (1958))).
, See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974) (vagueness doctrine requires legisla-
tures to set reasonably clear guidelines in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (same).
" See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Illinois, 110 S. Ct.
2281, 2291 n.15 (1990) (overbreadth doctrine is method allowing party whose own con-
duct is not protected by first amendment to challenge regulation as overbroad because of
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suspends the traditional rules of standing and permits defendants
to raise the claims of parties not before the court, that the statute
interferes with someone else's right of free speech, even though
the defendant himself could be properly convicted under the chal-
lenged statute.86
A finding of overbreadth results in a facial invalidation of the
statute rendering it unenforceable against all until it is properly
narrowed. 87 Where "pure speech" is not involved, but rather,
speech in the context of conduct, the overbreadth of a statute
must be substantial.88 The Court has described the overbreadth
required to invalidate a regulation as not only "real," but that
there exist more than a "marginal" number of impermissible ap-
plications so as to justify the regulation's invalidation. 89 Supreme
its impact on parties not before court); Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v.
Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989) (person invoking overbreadth "may challenge a statute
that infringes protected speech even if the statute constitutionally might be applied to him.
.") (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978)).
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (1989) (first amendment doc-
trine of substantial overbreadth is exception to normal rule of standing that "a person to
whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground
that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others." (quoting Board of Airport Comm'rs of
Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987))); Schaumburg 444 U.S. at 634
("[L]itigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by
showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not
before the court."); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) (where application of
rules would have inhibitory effect, they may not be applied). But ef. Monaghan, Overbreadth,
1981 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 1 [hereinafter Monaghan, Overbreadth]. Overbreadth is generally un-
derstood to be a departure from the conventional standing concept. Id. Monaghan contin-
ued by suggesting that an overbreadth challenge does not "possess a distinctive standing
component; it is, rather, the application of conventional standing concepts in the First
Amendment context." Id. at 3.
8" See Oakes, 109 S. Ct. at 2637 ("Overbreadth doctrine has wide-ranging effects, for a
statute found to be substantially overbroad is subject to facial invalidation."). See also
Turchick v. United States, 561 F.2d 719, 721 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977).
"Facial" overbreadth analysis should be distinguished from overbreadth "as ap-
plied" to a particular claimant. The latter involves a judgment as to the constitution-
ality of a challenged statute based on the harm caused to the litigating party. The
"as applied" method vindicates a claimant whose conduct is within the First Amend-
ment but invalidates the challenged statute only to the extent of the impermissible
application. "Facial" review proceeds without regard to the constitutional status of
the litigant's conduct. Under this approach, a statute prohibiting substantial activity
protected by the First Amendment is voided entirely.
Id. See generally Note, Overbreadth, supra note 80, at 845-46 (ramifications of overbreadth).
" See infra notes 89-90 (whether overbreadth is substantial or not by comparison of im-
permissible application to its legitimate application).
" See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985). Where "the over-
breadth is substantial the law may not be enforced against anyone, including the party
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Court precedent reflects that one or two hypothetical situations
where speech is affected is insufficient to strike down a statute ex-
cept where those situations involve a group of substantial size or
where the number of those "wrongfully affected" is proportion-
ally significant in relation to those who fall within the "legitimate
sweep" of the statute.'
Under a broad interpretation of begging," which makes no dis-
tinction between charitable solicitors and beggars as is commonly
understood, statutes that proscribe begging would affect protected
speech.9' The question for the Court is whether this is a sufficient
before the court." Id. Not until the statute is narrowed either by judicial construction or
legislative action is it enforeceable. Id. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) ("even
if there are marginal applications" where statute would infringe on free speech, facial in-
validation is inappropriate if "remainder of the statute ...covers a whole range of easily
identifiable and constitutionally proscribable .. .conduct .... "). See also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770 (1982) ("[Plarticulary where conduct and not merely speech is
involved ... the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))).
Cf. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 651-52 (1984). justice White, after citing Ferber
and Broadrick, assumed that the legitimate reach of the statute in question "dwarfs its ar-
guably impermissible applications ...." Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773). Dissenting,
justice Brennan criticized this assumption, instead believing that the proper inquiry was
whether persons will refrain from conduct because the statute is susceptible to application
to protected conduct. Regan, 468 U.S. at 684-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally,
Note, The Chilling Effect on Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
" Oakes, 109 S. Ct. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) "In order to be invalidated
under our overbreadth doctrine, a statute's unconstitutional application must be substan-
tial, not just in an absolute sense, but 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.'" (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
"1 See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 198 (1963) Begging is defined as: "1: to
ask for alms or charity: live by asking for charity 2: to ask earnestly: entreat humbly 3: to
make a formalized jesture or request." Id. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 188 (2d ed. 1987). "To ask for as a gift, as charity, or as a favor; to beg
alms". Id.
" Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3054 (1989). The Supreme
Court cannot supply a controlling interpretation of a state statute. Id. The Court will use
any limiting construction or interpretation of a statute supplied by the highest state court
unless the state court has fallen into plain error. Id. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S.
Ct. 2633, 2644 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (when Court reviews decision rest-
ing on state court's construction, that construction is binding on Supreme Court, whether
or not in its absence Court would have read statute that way); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 478 (1988) (Court defers to construction given by lower courts); Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (Court will consider actual text of statute as well as any limiting con-
structions (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 355 (1983) and Village of Hoffman Estates
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982))). Cf. FW/PBS v. City of
Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596, 624 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court will not presume State
would widen invalid reach of statute by giving it an expansive construction (citation omit-
ted)); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (statute should not be
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quantity of protected speech meriting an invalidation of the stat-
ute on its face.93 It is submitted that if one were to include groups
engaged in charitable solicitations under the definition of beg-
ging, this would likely result in a finding that a group of substan-
tial size is being wrongfully affected, whereas if a plain meaning of
begging were followed, and all such conduct was not classified as
speech, a court would be hard pressed to find a sufficient popula-
tion to satisfy the substantial overbreadth criteria.
B. Vagueness
The vagueness doctrine is related to the overbreadth doctrine
and is very often asserted when an overbreadth claim is made.94
Deriving from the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,95 the vagueness doctrine requires that a law provide suffi-
cient notice" as to what conduct is proscribed and that the law
stricken as overbroad unless it is not readily subject to narrowing state court construction).
See generally Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L.
REV. 76 (1937).
" See supra notes 89-90 ("substantial" requirement compares amount and extent of im-
permissible applications of statute -to amount of permissible applications).
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 680 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (doctrine of
vagueness and overbreadth have been traditionally viewed as logically related and similar
doctrines (citing Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. at 358-59 n.8 and Hoffnan Estates, 455 U.S.
at 494-95, 498-99)). "The vice of statutory vagueness, in the area of the first amendment,
is often very intimately related to the vice of overbreadth." Note, Overbreadth supra note
74, at 845 n.5. "Sometimes the two are functionally indistinguishable." Id. (citing Note,
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 110-13 (1960).
*4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " Id. See Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646-47 (1974) (while there is an interest in prompt and efficient pro-
cedures "the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular ... [are]
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing con-
cern for efficiency and efficacy .... " (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)
(constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency))).
" See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ("[T]he void for vagueness doc-
trine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited . . . ." (citing Hoffmnan
Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 (1982))); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (doc-
trine requires that person of ordinary intelligence is given fair notice that contemplated
conduct is forbidden; no person should be criminally responsible for conduct that could
not be reasonably understood to be proscribed); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230
(1951) ("essential purpose [of doctrine] is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences
of their conduct"). See generally Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and Approaches
in Criminal Law, 3 VAsn. L. REV. 531, 539-41 (1950) (purpose for requiring criminal statute
to be definite is to give individual sufficient warning).
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not permit or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.9 7 The sufficiency of the description of the forbidden con-
duct is important in all criminal statutes, but when a statute in-
fringes upon a first amendment right, due process concerns are
enhanced."8
Since many jurisdictions regulate begging in the context of loi-
tering or vagrancy laws, the susceptibility to a vagueness attack is
an important concern. 9  Historically, 0 vagrancy laws granted law
enforcement officials a large degree of discretion 0 ' in determin-
ing what behavior could be classified as criminal. Therefore, many
were successfully challenged on the basis that they were void for
" See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic pol-
icy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjec-
tive basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Third, but related, where a vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'
Id. at 108-09 (quoting Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961)
(citations omitted)). See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972)
(vague laws furnish a "convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local
prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure' " (quot-
ing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940))).
" See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, un-
aided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in
other contexts."); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943) (When statute implicates both fourteenth and first amendments test of legislation is
much more defined than test when only fourteenth is involved, and much of the vagueness
of the due process clause disappears when the specific provisions of the first amendment
become its standard). Accord Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 ("In the field of regulatory stat-
utes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater
leeway is allowed" (citing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340
(1952))).
"See supra note 77 (statutes prohibiting begging and loitering).
'" See Papachristou 405 U.S. at 161-62 n.4 (vagrancy acts developed in early England
during time when feudal system was in decay); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540
(1948) ("[Vagrancy] statutes are in a class by themselves, in view of the familiar abuses to
which they are put .... Definiteness is designedly avoided .... "). See generally MODEL
PENAL CODE § 250.6, commentary at 383-98 (1980) (tracing history of vagrancy and loiter-
ing provision to present day Code treatment).
1o1 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 306-07 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("govern-
ment officials may not be accorded unfettered discretion in making decisions that impinge
upon fundamental rights." (citing Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 168)); Kolender v. Lawson, 461
U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (criminal statute requiring persons who loiter or wander on streets to
provide credible and reliable identification found to violate due process because it vested
virtually complete discretion in police).
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vagueness.1 0 2 Loitering statutes have been subject to the same
concerns raised under the vagrancy statutes.'03 It is therefore im-
portant that the conduct meant to be disallowed by the statute be
sufficiently defined10 4 so as to minimize the possibility of prosecu-
tion for innocent conduct or the potential for arbitrary enforce-
ment. "0 Many jurisdictions take the approach that a specific in-
tent or illicit purpose is a required ingredient of a valid loitering
statute. 06 These standards help provide adequate notice of the
exact conduct prohibited and help restrict arrests to impermissible
acts, thereby foreclosing the possibility of arbitrary
enforcement.10 7
It can be fairly suggested that the term begging, to the ordinary
'0, See Winters, 333 U.S. at 540 ("Definiteness is designedly avoided so as to allow the net
to be cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of
the police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense"); People
v. Superior Court (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d 381, 403-05, 758 P.2d 1046, 1058, 250 Cal. Rptr.
515, 527-28 (1988) (In Bank; Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[vlagrancy laws have traditionally been
used to clear the streets of persons who have committed no crime but are nevertheless
deemed repugnant to segments of society" (citing extensive list of federal and state deci-
sions striking down vagrancy laws as unconstitutional)). See also Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d
309, 312, 229 N.E.2d 426, 424, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967) (holding N.Y. vagrancy
statute unconstitutional as an overreaching of the state's police power).
100 See infra note 104 (citing supporting authority).
10 Cf. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988) (objection to vagueness rests on
lack of notice, hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would
know what conduct is at risk); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951) ("impossi-
ble standards of specificity are not required" (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1
(1947)); "the test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warning when mea-
sured by common understanding and practices" (citing Connally v. General Construction
Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926))).
100 See supra note 97 (vague laws trap innocent and danger of discriminatory enforce-
ment exists).
'" See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 n.13 (1979)
[Tihe requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those conse-
quences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute
invalid .... The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not
render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some
respects uncertain. But it does relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes
without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware.
Id. (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945) (plurality opinion)). See
People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 384, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1359, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70 (1988)
(laws which prohibit loitering for illegal purpose or which refer to areas of restricted access
provide ordinary citizen with adequate notice of conduct prohibited and requires police to
objectively observe definable impermissible act, thereby foreclosing arbitrary enforce-
ment); Caswell, 46 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 758 P.2d at 1055, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 525-26 (extensive
list of states requiring specific intent for valid statute).
'0 See supra note 106 (statutes must be framed to provide adequate notice).
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man, connotes a plea for money or other consideration by a per-
son with no apparent means of support."0 8 While such a meaning
appears unambiguous, it is suggested that if begging can be inter-
preted as being indistinguishable from charitable solicitation,
which is a form of protected conduct, then the problem of im-
proper notice and the possibility of selective enforcement based
on the status of the individual arises. It is probable that legislators
who drafted laws prohibiting begging intended only to criminalize
begging as it is understood by its common meaning and not to
include organized groups who solicit contributions.' It is also
reasonable to assume legislatures would have treated the topic
with more care had their intentions been otherwise."a 0 Vagueness
could be avoided by defining begging to mean no more than it
would to the ordinary man. 1' In an excess of caution, the term
begging could be more thoroughly defined in penal statutes so as
to explicitly exclude charitable solicitations or to base illegality on
the aggressiveness of the solicitor's conduct."'
IV. DRAFTING A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND STATUTE
A comparison of the New York State and California statutes il-
lustrates one method that can be employed to help avoid constitu-
tional complications. The New York Penal Law provides that it
will be unlawful to loiter for the purpose of begging. 1 ' The cor-
responding California disorderly conduct statute provides that it is
a misdemeanor to accost someone for the purpose of begging."4
108 See supra note 91 (definitions of begging).
109 See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(d) (2d ed. 1986) (crimes of
personal condition are usually defined to punish status rather than to punish specific
action).
1 0 See supra note 109 (begging statutes are not intended to proscribe specific actions of
speech).
. See supra note 96 (vagueness doctrine requires man of ordinary intelligence be able to
understand what is made criminal).
.. See infra notes 113-119 (narrowly drafting statute by reference to conduct).
"I N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 1990). The statute provides: "A person is guilty
of loitering when he:
1. Loiters or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging . Id.
114 CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (1989). The statute provides: "Every person who commits...
the following act[] is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: . . . . (c) who accosts
other persons in any public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of
begging or soliciting alms." Id. (emphasis supplied).
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The addition of the word accost to the California statute, when
viewed in light of its legislative history, shifts the focus to the beg-
gar's conduct rather than to begging per se. 1 5 Its scope serves the
legislative purpose of protecting the sensibilities of its citizens,
while drafted in such a manner that enforcement has no relation-
ship to speech, even if begging could be classified as such. 1 6 The
statute is equally enforceable against a charitable solicitor's con-
duct; thus discriminatory enforcement based on the status of the
individual is avoided." 7 The New York statute, unlike the Califor-
nia statute, is susceptible to the problems previously discussed con-
cerning vagueness and overbreadth because it fails to modify
"begging" in any manner." 8 It is suggested that the California
legislature has found a way to properly limit a statute to serve the
permissible legislative purposes of protecting individuals from an-
noyance and from restricting their mobility, while avoiding ambi-
guity or overly restricting speech, should begging be so
classified."19
CONCLUSION
The possible protection afforded to begging under the first
amendment does not rise to the level of protection conferred
115 See C.C.B. v. State of Florida, 458 So. 2d 47, 49 (1984) ("[California statute] was
framed in this manner in order to exclude from one ambit of the law the blind or crippled
person who merely sits or stands by the wayside, the Salvation Army worker who solicits
funds for charity on the streets at Christmas time and others whose charitable appeals may
well be left to local control.") (quoting 2 Assem. J. Appendix (1961 Reg. Sess.) Assem.
Interim Com. Rep. (1959-1961) Crim. Proc. pp. 12-13)).
116 See Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-PiedmontJ.D., 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 127
Cal. Rptr. 445 (1976). See generally Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (municipalities
have power to enact regulations to keep streets free from those whose conduct bears no
necessary relationship to freedom of speech for benefit of those rightfully using them).
"a See supra note 97 (vagueness promotes discriminatory enforcement).
11 See supra notes 85-112 and accompanying text (discussion of overbreadth and
vagueness).
"I See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951) ("The police power of a
state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitu-
tional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.") (quoting Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949)). See also Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state has signifi-
cant interest in maintaining crowd control and in protecting its citizens from fraudulent or
deceptive solicitation practices). But see Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971)
(protection from annoyance is not a sufficient compelling reason to absolutely deprive one
of first amendment right).
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upon traditional or political speech since begging does not involve
pure speech. If begging were to be deemed commercial speech, it
would remain within legislative power to regulate to a greater ex-
tent than traditionally secured first amendment speech. Begging
also fails to find shelter under the guise of symbolic expression
since begging is not intertwined with an intent to communicate a
particularized message concerning traditional first amendment
values. Even assuming that begging is speech, begging may still be
regulated under the rules promulgated in O'Brien or that of time,
place or manner regulations. Statutes restricting begging are
more likely to survive judicial scrutiny if carefully phrased to
avoid vagueness, eliminate overbroad applications and place em-
phasis on conduct rather than begging per se.
Although the first amendment guarantees some of our most val-
uable freedoms it should not be used to reduce the hardships of a
growing social problem at the expense of extending the doctrine
into uncharted areas. Begging is a form of conduct which does
little to further the ideas that the Constitution seeks to protect. A
truly enlightened society should not have to struggle to obtain a
mere permissive attitude by stretching legal doctrines; it would re-
spond with philanthropy.
Patrick B. Gonzalez & Robert P. Kuehn
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